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SCALING THE ILLINOIS BRICK WALL:
THE FUTURE OF INDIRECT PURCHASERS
IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION
The Illinois Brick Company sold price-fixed bricks and con-
crete blocks. The State of Illinois sued Illinois Brick,' alleging that
the illegal overcharges were passed on to it by contractors who
used the bricks in building state facilities.2 The trial court dismissed
the suit, but the Seventh Circuit blessed the attempt.3 The Su-
1 The suit by the state followed civil and criminal actions brought by the United States
against the manufacturers. The district court accepted pleas of nolo contendere in the
criminal suit and entered a consent decree in the civil case. United States v. Ampress Brick
Co., [1974-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 75,060 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The plaintiffs in the private suit
included approximately 700 governmental entities in the Greater Chicago area. Their
complaint alleged that the overpayments totaled more than $3 million. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2065 (1977). Only four of the plaintiffs, however, purchased con-
crete blocks directly from the manufacturers, and only 7% of the 700 plaintiffs were able
to state the cost to them of the concrete block used in construction. Id. at 2065 n.6. All but
nine of the plaintiffs awarded their building contracts on the basis of competitive bidding.
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461, 463 (N.D. III. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th
Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977). In the one
example cited in petitioners' brief, the cost of the block was reported at less than 1/2 of 1%
of the total cost. 97 S. Ct. at 2065 n.6.
2 Passing-on is the "process whereby a businessman who has been overcharged adjusts
his own price upward to reflect the overcharge." McGuire, The Passing-On Defense and the
Right of Remote Purchasers to Recover Treble Damages Under Hanover Shoe, 33 U. Prrr. L. REv.
177, 181 (1971). See also R. POSNER, ANTITRUST CASES, ECONOMIc NOTES, AND OTHER
MATERIALS 5-13, 128-29, 147-49 (1974); notes 10-18 and accompanying text infra. Price
increases resulting from anticompetitive behavior, whether or not passed on, result in re-
duced output: marginal buyers who would otherwise enter the market at competitive prices
purchase substitutes or do without, thereby reducing demand and forcing output to de-
cline. See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. at 2068 n.13. To the extent that substitutes
are either higher in price or lower in value, artificial costs are imposed on purchasers.
Victims of a price-fixing scheme in a multi-level system of distribution thus fall into two
classes: (1) middle-level purchaser-sellers who lose profits or who are forced out of the
market, and (2) indirect purchasers who pay noncompetitive prices for the goods or for
substitutes, who are forced completely out of the market, or who are unable to find substi-
tutes. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968), deals with the
first class. Illinois Brick deals with the second.
The plaintiffs in Illinois Brick were separated from the violators by two intervening
transactions. The price-fixed bricks moved from the manufacturers through subcontrac-
tors and general contractors to the ultimate-purchaser plaintiffs, allegedly carrying with
them a four-cent-per-brick overcharge each time the goods changed hands.
3 Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163
(7th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub npm. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977). The
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preme Court granted certiorari, 4 and reversed the circuit court's
ruling.5 Relying on Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp.,6 the Court held that, absent exceptional circumstances, sec-
tion 4 of the Clayton Act7 bars antitrust actions by indirect pur-
chasers invoking an offensive pass-on theory.8
district court, in dismissing the indirect purchasers' suit, divided buyers into three groups:
immediate, final, and ultimate consumers. An immediate consumer was one who acted as a
middleman. A final consumer was defined as an indirect purchaser of a product that had
not been altered as it passed through the different levels in the chain of distribution. An
ultimate consumer was also an indirect buyer, but one who had purchased a product that
had been altered by a middleman. Hanover Shoe, the district court reasoned, blocked only
ultimate consumers from asserting claims of injury. Id. at 466-67. The court held that "as
to ultimate consumers, their injuries are too remote and consequential to provide legal
standing to sue against the alleged antitrust violator." Id. at 468 (emphasis in original). As
"ultimate consumers," the indirect purchasers of concrete blocks had no standing to sue;
the court therefore granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Id.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that "[tihe sweeping language of [section 4 of
the Clayton Act] and the policy encouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws
persuade us that if plaintiffs can prove a violation which resulted in an injury to them,
they ought to recover." 536 F.2d at 1165. The court of appeals found difficulties of proof
and multiple liability insufficient justifications to support the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment. Id. at 1166-67.
4 429 U.S. 938 (1976).
5 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2066 (1977).
6 392 U.S. 481 (1968). Hanover Shoe, a shoe manufacturer, sued United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp. under § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)), alleging that United's
policy of leasing rather than selling shoemaking machinery violated § 2 of the Sherman
Act (id. § 2). The trial court refused to hear evidence that Hanover Shoe, as the direct
lessor, had passed on the illegal overcharges to its customers. The Supreme Court, speak-
ing through Justice White, affirmed that decision, ireasoning that "'[tihe general tendency
of the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.'" 392 U.S.
at 488 n.6 (quoting with approval Southern Pac. Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245
U.S. 531, 533 (1918) (Holmes, J.)). The Court accordingly held that a direct purchaser is
entitled to damages even if he has passed on the overcharge:
A wide range of factors influence a company's pricing policies.... Even if it could
be shown that the buyer raised his price in response to, and in the amount of, the
overcharge and that his margin of profit and total sales had not thereafter de-
clined, there would remain the nearly insuperable difficulty of demonstrating that
the particular plaintiff could not or would not have raised his prices absent the
overcharge or maintained the higher price had the overcharge been discontinued.
... [E]stablishing the applicability of the passing-on defense ... would normally
prove insurmountable.
Id. at 492-93.
7 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (emphasis added).
8 See notes 39-48 and accompanying text infra.
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Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois9 substantially reduces the ability of
indirect purchasers to recover treble damages for antitrust viola-
tions. A number of options, however, remain available to plaintiffs
seeking to circumvent the decision. Careful analysis reveals that
Illinois Brick is a crucial step in the Court's search for effective and
efficient antitrust plaintiffs. The decision properly identifies pol-
icies relevant in evaluating the legal and practical implications of
passing-on, but in barring most indirect-purchaser suits the Court
went too far. Illinois Brick therefore requires a legislative response.
Congress must, however, avoid the Court's error of overreacting.
It should acknowledge the competing policies identified in Illinois
Brick, and require courts to balance them on a case-by-case basis.
I
THEORY AND HISTORY OF PASSING-ON
A. The Theory of Passing-On
Social scientists and policymakers recognize that anticompeti-
tive activity usually generates "ripple effects" in the economy.10
Pass-on theory is one mechanism developed by antitrust litigants to
give legal effect to this economic reality. Simply put, pass-on theory
suggests that the impact of anticompetitive activity filters down the
vertical chain of distribution, so that in effect a buyer other than
the original purchaser pays the initial overcharge." The-ultimate
purchaser bears the overcharge because the original buyer in-
creases the price of goods by an amount equal to the overcharge.
9 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977).
" See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 234-35 (1977). Any anticompetitive
activity generates super-normal prices and reduced output. These, in turn, are usually
responsible for misallocation of resources and deadweight losses to society in the form of
reduced consumer surplus-i.e., the quantitative detriment to society of imperfect competi-
tion. See id. at 201-05; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 8-19 (1970). These losses-both individual and social-are usually shared to
some extent by all subsequent purchasers in the vertical chain of distribution. See note 14
and accompanying text infra. In addition, anticompetitive activity in the vertical chain of
distribution increases barriers to entry at one or more levels, as well as discrimination in
pricing and supply. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY-AN ECONOMIC ANID-
LEGAL ANALYSIS 120-23 (1959).
11 Throughout the Note we will refer to "indirect purchasers." However, the analysis
of offensive passing-on is by no means limited to indirect purchasers. For instance, sellers
may pursue buyers one or more steps removed in the vertical chain of distribution if the
sellers have been injured by reason of a buyers' conspiracy to depress prices, and if the
sellers' complaint fits within one of the exceptions noted in Illinois Brick. See notes 80-93
and accompanying text infra.
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Both plaintiffs and defendants have invoked pass-on theory. De-
fendant-sellers have argued that direct-purchaser plaintiffs sus-
tained no injury because they passed on overcharges to the next
level in the chain of distribution; 12 conversely, in suits against re-
mote sellers, indirect purchasers have argued that middlemen
passed on overcharges to them.13
The practical difficulties of employing pass-on theory begin
with the realization that few, if any, situations arise where an over-
charge is completely passed on to indirect purchasers.' 4 That por-
tion of the overcharge passed on is determinable, in theory,
through the use of economic analysis commonly applied to excise
taxes. 15 Unhappily, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
with reasonable certainty the facts needed to apply this analysis.
Even if concepts like price-elasticity of demand were ascertainable,
the element of irrationality in pricing and purchasing would ren-
der the analysis suspect.' 6 Probability and risk analysis may elimi-
nate these defects,' 7 but such a solution raises serious questions of
12 See cases cited in note 21 infra.
" See cases cited in notes 28-29 infra.
14 See 97 S. Ct. 2076 n.3. The full overcharge resulting from a restraint will be passed
on to indirect purchasers only where demand is perfectly inelastic: that is, where buyers will
purchase a fixed quantity regardless of price fluctuation. This occurs in theory only. In
real markets demand always exhibits some sensitivity to price. See generally P. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMics 379-86 (1973). Thus, real market forces prevent any seller along the chain of
distribution from fully avoiding the effect of anticompetive activity by passing on the entire
overcharge: if he raises his price by the full amount of the initial overcharge, he will
experience a correspondingly greater reduction in the number of units sold, and hence a
net decrease in his profits. Cf. id. at 387-88 (allocation of sales tax between seller and
buyer). To maintain a profit-maximizing sales level each seller along the distribution chain
may pass on only a portion of the initial overcharge; he must absorb the rest. The price
elasticity of demand in the market of the next sale will determine what portion of the
overcharge a seller may pass on. If elastic demand prevails, the number of units sold is
relatively sensitive to price increases, and the seller may pass on only a small portion. If the
seller faces an inelastic demand, the quantity he can sell is less sensitive to price increases,
and thus he may pass on a relatively larger portion of the overcharge. See R. POSNER, supra
note 2, at 147-49. This suggests that remote purchasers would prefer to sue when markets
exhibit inelastic demand characteristics. Because each sdller will pass on a relatively large
portion of the overcharge from link to link along the chain of distribution, the remote
purchaser could expect a higher recovery.
15 See R. POSNER, supra note 10, at 509-14; Schaefer, Passing-On Theory in Antitrust Tre-
ble Damage Actions: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 16 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 883, 887-97
(1975). The majority in Illinois Brick rejected the possibility of using expert witnesses to
develop the facts necessary to apply this analysis. 97 S. Ct. at 2073.
16 Irrational pricing and purchasing decisions are made for a variety of reasons, even
where perfect information is available. See F. SCHERER, supra note 10, at 19-20. Moreover,
in many cases, the cost of obtaining information outweighs the benefit to be derived from
it. See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 81-84.
17 Probability analysis balances the rational and irrational components of aggregate
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fundamental fairness and permissible proof.18 Despite these diffi-
culties, juries often resolve complex damage issues in antitrust
cases without the aid of precise analytical tools. 19 Thus, prior to
pricing and purchasing decisions, allowing economists to utilize market data to determine
price elasticity of demand for a given product with a reasonable degree of certainty. See W.
BAUIOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 234-73 (1972).
I The judicial system exists primarily to resolve conflicts and to see that justice is
meted out to the particular litigants standing before the court, not to fashion principles of
collective justice. Moreover, the use of mathematical proof may result in a usurpation of
the responsibilities of the jury. See Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971), which criticizes the use of mathematics as a
tool in decisionmaking:
One element, at least, of that ritual of conflict-settlement is the presence and
functioning of the jury-a cumbersome and imperfect institution, to be sure, but
an institution well calculated, at least potentially, to mediate between "the law" in
the abstract and the human needs of those affected by it. Guided and perhaps
intimidated by the seeming inexorability of numbers, induced by the persuasive
force of formulas and the precision of decimal points to perceive themselves as
performing a largely mechanical and automatic role, few jurors-whether in crim-
inal cases or in civil-could be relied upon to recall, let alone to perform, this
humanizing function, to employ their intuition and their sense of community val-
ues to shape their ultimate conclusions.
Id. at 1376 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court of California rejected the use of prob-
ability evidence to determine guilt in People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d 319, 438 P.2d 33, 66
Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968). The prosecution bolstered a shaky identification of robbery suspects
by introducing mathematical testimony showing that there was but one chance in 12 mil-
lion that suspects chosen at random would have the described characteristics. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court found the evidence objectionable, noting that it "encouraged the jurors
to rely upon an engaging but logically irrelevant expert demonstration." Id. at 327, 438
P.2d at 38, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
19See Rowan v. Howard Sober, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 1121, 1125 (E.D. Mich. 1974). Cf.
William H. Rankin Co. v. Associated Bill Posters, 42 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.) ("Perhaps the
jury was not as competent to analyze that evidence [of plaintiff's damages resulting from
an antitrust violation] as some financial and business expert might have been, but it could
draw its own reasonable conclusions from it."), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 864 (1930). See
generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 149-81 (1966) (juries competent to
understand and make rational decisions based on complicated evidence). But see Farming-
ton Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 61, 83 (1st Cir. 1970) ("[T]here was
adequate reason to fear that the jury would be either confused or mesmerized by the
profusion of computations."). In Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1945),
the Court discussed the uncertainty inherent in calculating antitrust damages:
[T]he jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based on rel-
evant data, and render its verdict accordingly. In such circumstances 'juries are
allowed to act upon probable and inferential, as well as direct and positive proof."
... Any other rule would enable the wrongdoer to profit by his wrongdoing at
the expense of his victim. . . .Failure to apply it would mean that the more
grievous the wrong done, the less likelihood there would be of a recovery.
The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty [that prevents the jury from
measuring damages exactly] which his own wrong has created .... That principle
is an ancient one, ... and is not restricted to proof of damage in antitrust suits,
although their character is such as frequently to call for its application.
Id. at 264-65.
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Illinois Brick, many courts did not hesitate to send pass-on issues to
the jury.2 °
B. The History of Passing-On
Through the mid-1960's, a majority of courts confronting the
issue recognized passing-on as a defense to private treble-damage
claims.2 1 But in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,2
the Supreme Court rejected the pass-on defense, holding that a
direct purchaser could generally recover all illegal overcharges,
whether or not he had passed them on.23 Hanover Shoe emphasized
'0See In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] TRADE GAS. (CCH) 74,680, at
94,982 (D. Conn. 1973) ("[D]ifficulties of proof or apportionment of damages are not
indubitably insurmountable and should await trial before being resolved."), appeal dis-
missed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). See also McGuire, supra note 2, at 193; Schaefer, supra
note 15, at 915; Comment, Standing to Sue in Antitrust Cases: The Offensive Use of Passing-On,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 976, 992 (1975).
21 See, e.g., Freedman v. Philadelphia Terminals Auction Co., 301 F.2d 830 (3d Cir.
1962) (fruit brokers and wholesaler denied recovery against auction company for assessing
terminal charges where charges passed on to outlets). Prior to Hanover Shoe, the Supreme
Court hinted that it would uphold the passing-on defense. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.,
260 U.S. 156, 165 (1922) ("[N]o court or jury could say that, if the rate had been lower,
[the plaintiff] would have enjoyed the difference between the rates or that any other ad-
vantage would have accrued to him."). In the so-called "oil-jobber" cases, courts permitted
defensive passing-on but relied to some extent on evidence that the profit margins were
guaranteed, making the cases somewhat analogous to the cost-plus situation (see notes
87-93 and accompanying text infra). See, e.g., Clark Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 148
F.2d 580 (8th Cir.) (increase in price of gasoline supplied to jobbers passed on to jobbers'
customers), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945); Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 138 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1943) (increased price of gasoline to jobber passed on to ulti-
mate consumer), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 792 (1944); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 119
F.2d 747 (8th Cir.) (no evidence that increase in prices of gasoline not reflected in retail
price of gas), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Leonard v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 42 F.
Supp. 369 (W.D. Wis.) (complaint dismissed where plaintiff alleged price to jobber illegally
high without also alleging that jobber's selling price not correspondingly increased), appeal
dismissed, 130 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1942). In the 1960's, courts began to reject the pass-on
defense. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Elec. Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (generator manufacturers' defense that utilities buying generators passed on cost
increase disallowed); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 226 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y.
1964) (objections of plaintiff purchasers to defendant manufacturers' interrogatories based
on pass-on defense sustained); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 225
F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (evidence of pass-on irrelevant where plaintiff purchasers did
not resell goods and alleged overcharges hidden by complex rate bases), aff'd, 335 F.2d
203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 (1964). See also Pollock, Automatic Treble Damages
and the Passing-On Defense: The Hanover Shoe Decision, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 1183, 1192-203
(1968).
22 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
23 The Court elaborated:
We think it sound to hold that when a buyer shows that the price paid by him for
materials purchased for use in his business is illegally high and also shows the
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the practical impossibility of tracing the impact of a price-fix
through the chain of distribution due to the subjective nature of
pricing policies and the fluctuation of consumer demand.2 4 The
Court also noted that acceptance of the defense would substantially
impair antitrust enforcement, by necessitating joinder of all injured
buyers, including ultimate consumers with little interest in suing.25
The costs and complexity of antitrust suits would increase, private
enforcement would diminish, and "[i]n consequence, those who
violate the antitrust laws by price fixing or monopolizing would
retain the fruits of their illegality."26
Hanover Shoe resolved the debate over use of the pass-on de-
fense, but left unanswered the question of whether ultimate con-
sumers could use pass-on theory offensively against remote sell-
ers.27 The district courts and the courts of appeals dealt incon-
amount of the overcharge, he has made out a prima facie case of injury and
damage within the meaning of § 4.
Id. at 489.
24 As the Court in Hanover Shoe pointed out, courts must deal with "the real economic
world rather than an economist's hypothetical model." Id. at 493, quoted in Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061, 2073 (1977).
25 Id. at 494. Courts and commentators have speculated that ultimate consumers would
have too small an interest in the outcome to pursue antitrust claims. See, e.g., Handler &
Blechman, Antitrust and the Consumer Interest: The Fallacy of Parens Patriae and a Suggested
New Approach, 85 YALE L.J. 626 (1976). In City of Denver v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D.
620 (D. Colo. 1971), the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of all governmental
purchasers of asphalt in Colorado. The district court observed:
[The asphalt purchases of some of the smaller counties, cities and towns were of
quantities of liquid asphalt which were so small that even if plaintiff is successful
in the action and even if treble damages should be awarded in a class action to
those small counties, cities and towns, the discovery expense to which they would
be subjected would mean that they would wind up in the hole if they participated
in the class action.
Id. at 628. See also Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. at 2074-75. But see note 14 supra.
26 392 U.S. at 494.
27 Several commentators, writing before Illinois Brick, suggested that Hanover Shoe did
not affect offensive passing-on. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 771
n.3 (1977) ("[I]n Hanover Shoe, . . . the Court discusses the 'passing-on' of illegal over-
charges in terms which presuppose that 'ultimate consumers' . . . do have a cause of action
...."); McGuire, supra note 2, at 192; Schaefer, supra note 15, at 915 ("Decisional rules
should be developed to reflect the pervasiveness of passing-on .... This objective can be
met ... by granting standing to claimants when economic considerations suggest that they
in fact shouldered the burden of an illegal overcharge."); Comment, Mangano and
Ultimate-Consumer Standing: The Misuse of the Hanover Doctrine, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 394, 409
(1972) ("The Supreme Court's reference to ultimate consumers did not imply that they
could not bring suit, but merely that such parties would be unlikely to bring suit because of
the limited damages that they, as individuals, probably had suffered."); Comment, supra
note, 20, at 993. But see Lytle & Purdue, Antitrust Target Area Under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act: Determination of Standing in Light of the Alleged Antitrust Violation, 25 AM.
U.L. REv. 795, 820 (1976) (giving ultimate consumers standing to sue would result in
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sistently with suits by indirect purchasers. Some courts rejected
offensive application of pass-on theory, noting that it involved the
same insuperable difficulties of proof that prompted the Supreme
Court to reject the pass-on defense.28 Other courts, however, sanc-
tioned offensive use of pass-on theory despite the complexities of
proving injury and apportioning damages.2 9 They noted that
"[p]rivity is not required in antitrust cases," 30 criticized the blind
application of Hanover Shoe, 31 and found that enforcement goals
outweighed derivative goals such as judicial economy.32 These
courts perceived little danger of duplicative liability in view of
available procedural devices, 33 including consolidation and inter-
"huge economic repercussions"); Note, The Effect of Hanover Shoe on the Offensive Use of the
Passing-On Doctrine, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 98, 99 (1972) (Hanover Shoe best read to bar offen-
sive pass-on theory in all but rare cases).
25 See, e.g., In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 73 F.R.D. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1976);
Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 67 F.R.D. 461 (N.D. Ill. 1975), rev'd, 536 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.
1976), rev'd sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977); Donson Stores, Inc.
v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Balmac, Inc. v. American Metal
Prods. Corp., [1972] TRADE CAS. (CCH) V 74,235 (N.D. Cal. 1972); City of Denver v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620 (D. Colo. 1971); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Mangano
v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1971); Philadel-
phia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 323 F. Supp. 381 (E.D.
Pa. 1970).
2 See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, [1977-1] TRADE CAS.
(CCH) 1 61,434 (D.D.C. 1977); Carnivale Bag Co. v. Slide-Rite Mfg. Corp., 395 F. Supp.
287 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re
Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973),
appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). Cf. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.) (settlement upheld despite direct purchasers' argument that indirect
purchasers not proper class members), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
3 In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 197 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 919 (1974). Some post-Hanover Shoe cases, however, approached the injury issue
on the basis of privity of contract between the victim and the wrongdoer. The closer the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, the more likely it was that the plaintiff
could prove his injury was proximately caused by the violation. See, e.g., City of Denver v.
American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 620, 637 (D. Colo. 1971) ("Hanover Shoe permits recovery
when, but only when, there is privity .... ").
3' See Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ("[I]t would
be stretching Hanover Shoe beyond all recognition to hold that its rejection of the passing-
on defense somehow returns § 4 of the Clayton Act to the 'days when 'privity' was king'
...."). See also Pollock, Standing to Sue, Remoteness of Injury and the Passing-On Doctrine, 32
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 5, 14 (1966).
2 See In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
3 See, e.g., Illinois v. Ampress Brick Co., 536 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[A]c-
cording standing to ultimate purchasers need not result in double recovery because ap-
propriate means can be found to apportion any damages that might be assessed."), rev'd
sub nom. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977); In re Western Liquid Asphalt
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pleader.34
Thus, the lower courts placed varying emphases on considera-
tions of judicial economy, antitrust enforcement, and multiple lia-
bility. In so doing, they created a confused and confusing body of
case law dealing with the pass-on theory. These conflicting deci-
sions prompted the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Illinois
Brick.
II
THE Illinois Brick DECISION
In Illinois Brick the Supreme Court3 5 balanced the goals of
section 4 against the burdens of complex multiparty actions and
the risk of exposing defendants to multiple liability.36 All of the
Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 201 (9th Cir. 1973) ("The day is long past when courts, particularly
federal courts, will deny relief to a deserving plaintiff merely because of procedural dif-
ficulties or problems of apportioning damages."), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes
v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 596 (N.D. Ill. 1973) ("[P]rocedural resources
available to both the court and the parties are sufficient to avoid . . . an inequitable re-
sult."); In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] TRADE GAS. (CCH) 74,680, at
94,979 (D. Conn. 1973), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975).
34 In addition to statutory interpleader (see 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970)) and consolidation
(see FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a)), several lower courts suggested that the four-year statute of
limitations, the availability of special masters, and the doctrines of res judicata and collat-
eral estoppel minimized the threat of multiple liability. See, e.g., In re Western Liquid As-
phalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v.
General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re Master Key Antitrust Litiga-
tion, [1973-2] TRADE GAS. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973), appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir. 1975). The utility of these doctrines and procedures is questionable. For example, the
defendant considering interpleader faces a Hobson's choice of interpleading all ultimate
consumers and forming a massive class action, or not interpleading and remaining subject
to multiple suits. For a discussion of these devices and their applicability to antitrust ac-
tions, see McGuire, supra note 2, at 197-202; Comment, supra note 27, at 410-11; Com-
ment, supra note 20, at 993-95.
To avoid duplicative recoveries where the direct purchaser recovers first, courts could
require the direct purchaser (1) to post bond in the amount of his recovery (see Schaefer,
supra note 15, at 935); (2) to deposit the recovery in an escrow account (see McGuire, supra
note 2, at 199); or (3) to hold the fund, at least in part, in constructive trust for the
indirect purchaser (see id. at 198). Thereafter, if the court permits an indirect purchaser to
assert a pass-on claim, part or all of his recovery would come from the direct purchaser,
thereby avoiding duplicative recoveries against the known violator.
In Illinois Brick the defendants could have easily avoided duplicative recoveries because
both direct and indirect purchasers sued simultaneously in the Northern District of Illinois.
See 97 S. Ct. at 2084 n.22 (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.). By failing to seek consolidation
under FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a), the defendants arguably assumed the risk of duplicative
awards. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 28, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97
S. Ct. 2061 (1977).35 Justice White wrote for the majority of six. Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined
Justice Brennan in dissent.
36 See 97 S. Ct. at 2070-73, 2083-84. Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15
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Justices agreed that vigorous private enforcement of the antitrust
laws nurtures competition, compensates victims for their losses,
and punishes violators with heavy damages. 37 Their disagreement
focused on the best method of upholding these goals without sub-
verting other antitrust objectives, general considerations of fair-
ness, and efficient judicial administration.3 8
The majority first found passing-on an all-or-nothing prop-
osition: to allow offensive passing-on would necessitate overrul-
ing Hanover Shoe and restoring the pass-on defense.3 9 Given this
(1970)) was intended to foster and encourage competition by allowing private enforcement
of the antitrust laws. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). See also Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Co., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) ("[T]he purposes of
the antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present
threat to deter anyone contemplating business behavior in violation of the *antitrust laws.").
The treble-damage provision (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)) deters illegal conduct and compen-
sates the victims of antitrust violations for injury to business or property. The Court's
decision in Illinois Brick furthers the deterrence goal of § 4 to a greater degree than it
ensures compensation of injured parties. The majority quoted with approbation Justice
Brennan's dissenting statement that "from the deterrence standpoint, it is irrelevant to
whom damages are paid, so long as some one redresses the violation." 97 S. Ct. at 2075.
Because indirect purchasers typically have "such a small stake" in the outcome and rarely
have the motivation to assert their rights, the Court decided that § 4 goals were best
achieved by direct-purchaser suits. Id. But see note 14 supra. The decision, however, effec-
tively nullifies the compensatory function of § 4 in pass-on situations by allowing the unin-
jured direct purchaser to recover for the indirect purchaser's injury.
In addition to deterring and compensating, § 4 seeks to ensure that wrongdoers are
deprived of the "fruits of their illegality." Id. (quoting Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. at 494). The best way to make sure that violators do not escape lia-
bility, the majority decided, was to limit suits to the class of plaintiffs-direct purchasers-
with the fewest evidentiary obstacles in their path. Id.
37 Id. at 2075 (majority), 2076 (dissent).
" See id. at 2074-75 (majority), 2078-79 (dissent). See generally note 36 supra.
39 97 S. Ct. at 2070. The majority gave two reasons to support this notion of sym-
metry. First, asymmetrical application would result in undesirable duplicative recoveries
against antitrust defendants. Assuming that the direct purchaser would "automatically" re-
cover damages in "the full amount of the overcharge," no matter when he sued, the Court
reasoned that to allow the indirect purchaser to recover would lead to overlapping re-
coveries. Id. at 2067. The validity of this argument turns on whether courts can fashion
relief and employ procedural devices to avoid multiple liability. See notes 33-34 and ac-
companying text supra.
Second, the Court concluded that adoption of offensive pass-on theory would effec-
tively undercut the primary rationale of Hanover Shoe. "The principle basis for the decision
in Hanover Shoe was the Court's perception of the uncertainties and difficulties in analyzing
price and out-put decisions . . . and on the costs to the judicial system and the efficient
enforcement of the antitrust laws of attempting to reconstruct those decisions in the court-
room." 97 S. Ct. at 2068. Justice White perceived that the complex economic analyses and
complicated proofs associated with defensive pass-on would be "multiplied in the offensive
use of pass-on by a plaintiff several steps removed from the defendant." To apply the ra-
tionale of Hanover Shoe consistently, the majority reasoned, offensive pass-on could sur-
vive, if at all, only if Hanover Shoe were repudiated. Id. at 2068-69.
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choice, the Court concluded that disallowing both offensive and
defensive passing-on would best address the goals underlying the
antitrust laws. 40 If symmetrical pass-on theories were allowed, the
Court reasoned, indirect purchasers would often choose not to
sue.41 Not only would their injuries, and thus their recoveries, be
relatively small, but the costs of litigation would often be prohibi-
tive due to the difficulty of proving loss and the complexity as-
sociated with pass-on theories.42 Furthermore, the possibility of
inconsistent judgments raised the unseemly specter of duplicative
recoveries. 43 Finally, calculating the distribution of overcharges at
various market levels would, even if possible, necessitate employ-
ing economic analyses of questionable validity.44
On the other hand, the Hanover Shoe rule, by providing the
strong incentive of full overcharge recoveries, renders direct pur-
chasers superior section 4 plaintiffs in terms of deterring unlawful
conduct and depriving violators of their illegal gains.45 In addition,
The Illinois Brick plaintiffs self-servingly agreed that if they were allowed to use pass-
on offensively, the manufacturers should be allowed to use pass-on defensively against
direct purchasers. Id. at 2066. The better view was espoused by the dissent and by the
United States as amicus curiae. Id. at 2078-79; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at
4-6, Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. 2061 (1977). Justice Brennan correctly described
the Court's consistent application of the Hanover Shoe rule as having only "superficial ap-
peal"; in fact, the "interests at stake" in offensive and defensive pass-on are quite different.
For example, allowing an offensive pass-on theory in Illinois Brick would promote compen-
sation, while allowing defensive use of passing-on in Hanover Shoe would only have facili-
tated the defendant's escape from liability. 97 S. Ct. at 2078-79.
40 97 S. Ct. at 2075-76.
41 Id. at 2074-75. "The combination of increasing the costs and diffusing the benefits
of bringing a treble-damage action could seriously impair this important weapon of anti-
trust enforcement." Id. at 2075.
42 The majority concluded that apportioning recoveries would not only increase court
costs but decrease the benefits to each plaintiff, by "addling] whole new dimensions of
complexity to treble-damage suits and seriously undermin[ing] their effectiveness." Id. at
2070. Even if procedural devices could satisfactorily bring all potential claimants together,
the result would be "massive multiparty litigations involving many levels of distribution and
including large classes of ultimate consumers remote from the defendant." Id. at 2072.
43 Id. at 2070 n.18. Under a symmetrical application of pass-on theory, duplicative li-
ability will not result if all factfinders reach the correct conclusions. It is the risk of incon-
sistent factfindings that raises the risk of overlapping liability. On the other hand, asym-
metrical application of passing-on will necessarily result in duplicative awards since indirect
purchasers will be able to recover even if direct purchasers recover the full overcharge.
44 97 S. Ct. at 2073.
45 Id. at 2074-75. The legislative history of § 4 indicates, however, that Congress in-
tended treble-damage suits to serve as an "antitrust weapon" that is "available to the peo-
ple." 21 CONG. REc. 3146, 3147 (1890) (remarks of Senators Reagan and George). Justice
Brennan, in dissent, found "[a] further indication of Congress' desire to create a remedy
for all persons [in] the elimination of the jurisdictional amount requirement for antitrust
actions." 97 S. Ct. at 2079 n.l1. See also John Lenore & Co. v. Olympia Brewing Co., 550
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barring both pass-on theories would substantially reduce the com-
plexity of section 4 actions. 46 Although recognizing the compensa-
tory aim of section 4, the majority refused to take that concept to
its "logical extreme. '47 The Court feared that permitting all indi-
rect purchasers to sue would merely reduce overall recoveries
rather than "make individual victims whole for actual injuries."48
In light of these considerations, the Court concluded that as a gen-
eral rule only direct purchasers could be "injured in [their] busi-
ness or property" within the meaning of section 4.49
The dissenters argued that the uncertainties and complexities
of estimating damages were unconvincing reasons to deny a whole
class of plaintiffs the opportunity to prove their injuries. 50 Justice
Brennan observed that direct purchasers who wish to maintain
business relationships with overcharging suppliers would simply
pass on price increases and not sue. 5 ' Moreover, the dissenters
F.2d 495, 498 (9th Cir. 1977) (recent Supreme Court opinion construed § 4 more as re-
medial than as deterrence- or punishment-oriented statute).
Many commentators have questioned the deterrent effect of private treble-damage ac-
tions. See, e.g., Parker, Treble Damage Action-A Financial Deterrent to Antitrust Violations?, 16
ANTITRUST BULL. 483 (1971). Cf. Erickson, The Profitability of Violating the Antitrust Laws:
Dissolution and Treble Damages in Private Antitrust, 5 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 101 (1972)
(calling for structural reform of markets); Schaefer, supra note 15, at 910-11 (noting that
some violations benefit society), 912 (discussing factors making antitrust violations prof-
itable).
46 97 S. Ct. at 2070-75.
4 7 1d. at 2075.
4 8
/d.
491d. at 2066. Section 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970)) is set out in note 7
supra.
-0 Id. at 2082. The dissenters also argued vigorously that the enactment of the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (codified in principal part at 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 15c-15h (West Supp. 1977)) precluded the Court from holding that indirect
purchasers are not injured within the meaning of § 4. 97 S. Ct. at 2080. Title III of the
Act permits state attorneys general to bring parens patriae damage suits on behalf of state
residents injured by antitrust violations. See notes 68-79 and accompanying text infra. The
legislative history of the Act indicated that Congress belieyed it was plugging a gap in § 4 of
the Clayton Act by providing a mechanism to protect rights "which every consumer already
has in theory, but which small consumers are in practice unable to exercise." 122 CONG.
REc. H2065 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1976) (remarks of Rep. Seiberling). The majority, however,
asserted that Illinois Brick was not a parens patriae suit, and cited the House Report, which
describes the Act as creating "no new substantive liability," but merely a new procedural
device. 97 S. Ct. at 2069 n.14. See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 9, reprinted
in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2572, 2575, 2578.
51 97 S. Ct. at 2084. This criticism assumes that the restraint's impact on direct pur-
chasers never reaches the point where a direct purchaser finds it more lucrative to sue
his suppliers than to maintain business relationships with them. For instance, to the extent
that suppliers uninvolved in the conspiracy exist in the relevant market, the direct pur-
chaser's incentive to sue remains unimpaired, because competitive alternatives to the re-
[Vol. 63:309
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noted that Illinois Brick frustrates the compensatory and deterrent
goals of the treble-damage provision by precluding injured con-
sumers bearing "the brunt of antitrust injuries" from recovering
their damages. 52 Available procedural safeguards, in the view of
the dissenters, would adequately protect defendants against over-
lapping losses.53
III
CIRCUMVENTING Illinois Brick
Can litigants devise methods to circumvent the restrictions of
Illinois Brick? The Court's broad pronouncements appear to pre-
vent large numbers of indirect purchasers from suing.54 However,
the exceptions noted by the Court and alternative grounds of pri-
vate recovery will allow many indirect purchasers to pursue anti-
trust claims.55 In addition, state parens patriae actions will help en-
sure that antitrust violators do not go unpunished.
straint exist. The criticism also assumes that the market affected by the restraint is not a
monopsony, i.e., a market dominated by a single purchaser. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 14,
at 586. A powerful buyer can blunt the impact of any restraint to the extent he exercises
market power over his suppliers. In short, the direct purchaser's incentive to sue depends
on the unique characteristics of the markets involved. This incentive is not necessarily im-
paired by a desire to maintain business relationships with suppliers.
52 97 S. Ct. at 2076-77. Moreover, in Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948), the Supreme Court construed the goals of the federal anti-
trust laws broadly, stating: "[§ 4] does not confine its protection to consumers, or to pur-
chasers, or to competitors, or to sellers ... [but] is comprehensive in its terms and coverage,
protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated." Id. at 236, quoted in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. at 2076 (dissenting
opinion, Brennan, J.). Nevertheless, in the majority's judgment, "the antitrust laws will be
more effectively enforced by concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the
direct purchasers than by allowing every plaintiff ... to sue only for the amount it could
show was absorbed by it." 97 S. Ct. at 2069. As the dissent points out, however, the tre-
bling of damages provides an incentive for plaintiffs with small claims to sue. Id. at 2079
n.12.
53 97 S. Ct. at 2083-84. See notes 33-34 and accompanying text supra. The dissent
noted that the problem of multiple liability would arise in only two situations: "(1) where
suits by direct and indirect purchasers are pending at the same time but in different
courts; and (2) where additional suits are filed after an award of damages based on the
same violation in a prior suit." 97 S. Ct. at 2083.
54 For a post-Illinois Brick case evidencing this result, see In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litigation, [1977-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,596 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (indirect purchasers sum-
marily removed from plaintiff class in light of Illinois Brick).
-5 These possibilities, in turn, present direct purchasers with problems; the Court's
insistence on treating offensive and defensive passing-on identically (see 97 S. Ct. at 2066-
70) indicates that defendants should be permitted to utilize the exceptions articulated in
Illinois Brick to diminish or eliminate the direct purchaser's recovery where indirect pur-
chasers are permitted to sue.
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A. State Antitrust Laws
Due to the breadth of federal legislation, 56 the treble-damage
remedy of the Clayton Act,57 and the provision that a prior adverse
antitrust judgment is primafacie proof of present violation, 58 most
antitrust plaintiffs prefer to sue under federal antitrust law. 59 But
even if Illinois Brick precludes indirect purchasers from recovering
under the Clayton Act,60 state antitrust laws may provide an equiv-
alent remedy.61
56 Note, The Commerce Clause and State Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469,
1470-71 (1961) (federal law, unlike many state statutes, permits private actions; unclean
hands defense "has all but disappeared" in federal antitrust suits).
57 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
5 Id. § 16(a).
59 Cf Note, supra note 56, at 1470 (several factors favor suits based on federal stat-
utes). Many plaintiffs prefer alleging federal violations due to the preferability of the fed-
eral forum. "Federal judges are experienced in handling complex and protracted anti-
trust litigation, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain special rules for the
treatment of 'big' cases." Id. at 1470 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiffs suing under federal antitrust law will often also allege violations of state
antitrust laws. Under the doctrine of pendant jurisdiction, the state claim may ride into
federal court on the back of the federal claim. See Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
However, in light of Illinois Brick, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for indirect purchas-
ers to pursue state claims in federal courts. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536 (1974)
(pendant claim cognizable in federal courts only if federal claim "substantial"). On the
other hand, state courts can try federal claims, because federal courts have original, but
not exclusive, jurisdiction "of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act of Con-
gress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and mo-
nopolies." 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). But see Van Dussen-Storto Motor Inn, Inc. v. Rochester
Tel. Corp., 72 Misc. 2d 34, 338 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1972) ("original" jurisdiction means "exclu-
sive" jurisdiction). A defendant may remove a federal claim asserted in state court to fed-
eral court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
60 Illinois Brick cuts off the indirect purchaser only from the protection of § 4 of the
Clayton Act. Section 16 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970)), which provides for injunctive
relief, has a lower threshold for showing injury than does § 4. The plaintiff need only
demonstrate "threatened loss or damage." See Buckley Towers Condominium, Inc. v. Buch-
wald, 533 F.2d 934, 938 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[T]o achieve standing under Section 16 a plain-
tiff must demonstrate a loss or injury cognizable in equity proximately resulting from the
alleged antitrust violation."). However, because anticompetitive activities are characteristi-
cally clandestine, equitable relief usually comes too late to furnish any real protection. An
antitrust litigant might also bring a declaratory judgment action to determine his legal
rights under the antitrust laws. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). He must be able to show,
however, that a justiciable controversy exists. Id. A declaratory judgment has the force and
effect of a final decree, and, under 28 U.S.C. § 2202, the courts may grant any "necessary
or proper" relief. See also Wilson Tariff Act § 77, 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970) (any person injured
in business or property may bring treble-damage action against unlawful conspiracies in-
volving importation of foreign goods); Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, id. §§ 1221-1225
(new cause of action independent of federal antitrust laws, permitting franchised au-
tomobile dealer to bring action for damages against automobile manufacturer for failure to
comply with terms of franchise).
61 At least 40 states have statutes providing for private rights of action for antitrust
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Many states have a strong policy against anticompetitive ac-
tivity,62 and have passed statutes that embody the principles un-
derlying the Sherman Act.6 3 In increasing numbers, states have
violations. For a list of these statutes, see Rhodes, Some Thoughts on the Search for Private
Rights of Action Under State Antitrust Statutes Lacking "Little Clayton 4" Provisions, 25 EMORY
L.J. 767, 769 n.15 (1976). Six states (Florida, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North
Dakota, and Texas) with antitrust statutes do not specifically provide for private enforce-
ment. Id.
Private antitrust actions originally grew out of common-law contract and tort concepts.
See Brown & Allen v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 115 Ga. 429, 41 S.E. 553 (1902); M. HANDLER,
H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY, & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REG-
ULATION 1-96 (1975); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 155-61. Thus, in states lacking statu-
tory provisions for private enforcement, courts may nevertheless apply antitrust principles.
See, e.g., Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 349, 304 A.2d 493, 496 (apply-
ing in state suit principles of Sherman Act, which "'is merely the application of the com-
mon-law doctrine concerning the restraint of trade' "), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973).
State enforcement of state antitrust laws may also provide a weapon against antitrust
violators effectively immunized from liability by Illinois Brick. Although the federal antitrust
laws are based on the plenary power of the Commerce Clause, states may regulate com-
merce that is not wholly intrastate if the activity has a local impact. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Tennessee, 217 U.S. 413 (1910) (Holmes, J.) (federal antitrust laws do not preclude states
from antitrust enforcement activity); Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 265, 93
N.E.2d 751, 762 (1950) ("If State laws have no force as soon as interstate commerce begins
to be affected, a very large area will be fenced off in which the States will be practically
helpless to protect their citizens without, so far as we can perceive, any corresponding
contribution to the national welfare."); State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wash. 2d 761,
764, 394 P.2d 226, 228 (1964) ("[S]tate action incidentally affecting commerce is valid
when there exists sufficient local significance and impact to justify the exercise of the
police power."); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 721, 144 N.W.2d 1, 12
("The state may, ordinarily, protect the interests of its people by enforcing its antitrust act
against persons doing business in interstate commerce .... "), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990
(1966). Cf. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976) (wholly in-
trastate activity may still violate Sherman Act if it has any interstate impact). See generally
J.J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 64-108 (1964). Assorted other
reasons also minimize public enforcement of state antitrust laws: "the chronic lack of legis-
lative appropriations and attorney general interest ... ineffective or nonexistent investiga-
tive procedures . . . cumbersome and often unworkable remedies and sanctions . .. [and)
antiquated laws and procedures." Rubin, Rethinking State Antitrust Enforcement, 26 U. FLA. L.
REv. 653, 697-98 (1974) (footnotes omitted).
62 "[O]nly seven states . . . are presently without a statute of general application pro-
hibiting either monopolies or restraints of trade, or both." Rubin, supra note 61, at 658.
The case law also underscores states' anticompetitive policies. See, e.g., Speegle v. Board of
Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34, 44, 172 P.2d 867, 873 (1946) ("[U]nder the common law
of this state combinations entered into for the purpose of restraining competition and
fixing prices are unlawful .... The public interest requires free competition so that prices
be not dependent upon an understanding among suppliers of any given commodity, but
upon the interplay of the economic forces of supply and demand.").
6 3 See State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis. 2d 699, 716, 144 N.W.2d 1, 9, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966); Rubin, supra note 61, at 658 n.28. In fact, legislation against
monopolies and restraints of trade originated in the states. By 1890, when Congress passed
the Sherman Act, 21 states had already passed antitrust laws. See Note, supra note 56,
at 1469 n.l. But see Rubin, supra note 61, at 657 n.22 (13 states had pre-1890 antitrust
statutes).
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adopted or amended antitrust statutes to allow treble-damage rem-
edies and attorneys' fees awards. 6" Although most state statutes
speak in terms of "injury," the criteria for determining which
plaintiffs are sufficiently injured to proceed under state laws are
unclear.65 In light of Illinois Brick's inhibitory effect on consumer
suits alleging Clayton Act violations, state courts sympathetic to
consumer claims may liberally construe the meaning of "injury,"
and allow indirect purchasers to recover under state law. State
courts, however, are procedurally ill-equipped to handle large law-
suits, and far less experienced than federal courts in dealing with
complex litigation. 66  The complexity-avoidance and judicial-
economy rationales of Illinois Brick, although articulated in the con-
text of a federal suit, are thus even more compelling in the state-
court setting. It therefore seems likely that state courts will rely on
the persuasive authority of Illinois Brick to bar suits by indirect
purchasers. 67
The federal laws are so pervasive that state enforcement of antitrust policies has by
and large taken second place to federal enforcement. But Congress, in passing the Sher-
man Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)), intended to supplement, rather than supplant, state
regulations and "to arm the Federal courts within the limits of their constitutional power
that they may co-operate with the State courts in checking, curbing, and controlling the
most dangerous combinations that now threaten the business, property, and trade of the
people of the United States." 21 CONG. REC. 2457 (1889) (remarks of Senator Sherman).
See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POxICY 164-225 (1955).
64 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750 (1964 & West Supp. 1977); Illinois Anti-
trust Act § 7, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325.8019 (West
Supp. 1977); VA. CODE § 59.1-9.12(b) (Supp. 1977); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.020
(Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 133.01 (West 1974). In many states, the trial court has the
discretion to authorize an award of up to three times the amount of actual damages. See
Rhodes, supra note 61, at 769. Hawaii establishes a minimum recovery in antitrust actions
of "$1,000.00 or threefold damages ...sustained, whichever sum is the greater." HAW.
REv. STAT. § 480-13(a)(1) (Supp. 1975).6
-
5 See, e.g., Weissensee v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 59 Cal. App. 3d 723, 128, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 188, 191 (1976) ("In private actions ... it is basic 'that the suitor must have suffered
damages flowing directly from the violation of the Act.' "); Saxer v. Philip Morris, Inc., 54
Cal. App. 3d 7, 23, 126 Cal. Rptr. 327, 336 (1975) ("The alleged antitrust violation need
not be the sole or controlling cause of the injury in order to establish proximate cause, but
only need be a substantial factor in bringing about the injury."); Elliott v. Amerada Pe-
troleum Corp., [1959] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 69,247 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1959) (state court not
bound by federal law of antitrust injury).
16 See note 59 supra.
67 At least one state instructs its courts to "be guided by the interpretation given by the
federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters" dealt
with in the antitrust statutes of that state. WASH. Rv. CODE ANN. § 19.86.920 (Supp. 1976).
Should states sanction offensive pass-on theory under their statutes, one ironic scenario
would find federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction over state antitrust claims. See 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). This would result in the very complexity and risk of multiple liability
the Court attempted to avoid in Illinois Brick. The possibility of this result may influence
state courts to accommodate federal interests by following Illinois Brick.
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B. Parens Patriae
At common law, a state may sue as "parens patriae, trustee,
guardian or representative of all her citizens. '68 However, in
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 69 the Supreme Court held that section 4
of the Clayton Act precluded an action brought by a state suing on
behalf of its citizens and on its own behalf "to recover damages for
injury to its general economy."70 Congress reversed this result by
passing the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act.7 ' Un-
der the Act, state attorneys general may sue for monetary relief in
the name of the state on behalf of citizens injured by anticompeti-
tive activity.72 According to the legislative history of the Act, it cre-
ates "no new substantive liability" and operates only where citi-
zens of the state would otherwise have a cause of action under
section 4.73 Thus, the State of Illinois could not amend its com-
plaint to allege a parens patriae action on behalf of its ultimate-
consumer citizens.7 4 In many cases, however, a state could move to
assert the claims of direct purchasers who have not sued because of
delicate business relationships with suppliers.75 In such a case, pa-
rens patriae presents no problems of apportionment, because the
66 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900).
69 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
70 d. at 264. The state alleged conspiracy and combination to restrain trade and com-
merce in the sale by the defendant of refined petroleum products. Id. at 253. The Su-
preme Court found that "[a] large and ultimately indeterminable part of the injury to the
'general economy,' ... is no more than a reflection of injuries to the 'business or property'
of consumers, for which they may recover themselves under § 4." Id. at 264.
71 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 15c-15h (West Supp. 1977).
72 "Any attorney general of a State may bring a civil action in the name of such State,
as parens patriae on behalf of natural persons residing in such State . . .for injury sus-
tained by such natural persons to their property by reason of any violation of Sections 1 to
7 of this title." 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977).
73 See H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, 9, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2572, 2575, 2578. The Senate Report states: "Of course, State Attorneys
General still would be required to prove that defendants violated the antitrust laws; that
consumers were damaged by such violation in the form of higher prices or otherwise;
and the approximate amount of such damage." S. REP. No. 803, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 43
(1976).
74 To the extent that Illinois Brick denies indirect purchasers the right to sue, it effec-
tively nullifies the new parens patriae legislation. 97 S. Ct. at 2084 n.23 (dissenting opinion,
Brennan, J.).
7' See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. at 2075, 2077; In re Western Liquid As-
phalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 198 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974). There are
many instances in which direct purchasers would not bring suit because they are "neither
motivated nor in a financial or strategic position to maintain a private antitrust action."
Boshes v. General Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 598 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See Schaefer, supra
note 15, at 913 ("Direct purchasers . . .may escape injury by passing on an illegal over-
charge or may be related so intimately to the violator that they have no desire to pursue
private law enforcement.").
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state, if successful, will recover the full amount of the initial over-
charge.7 6
The parens patriae suit has a number of drawbacks. Most prob-
lematic is the limited availability and use of the action. Only a state
attorney general can sue in parens patriae ,'7  and it is unlikely that
mandamus will lie to compel attorney general action.7 8 The risk of
sporadic enforcement due to political and financial considerations
further diminishes the utility of parens patriae.7 9 Finally, the lack of
76 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 97 S. Ct. at 2067. A recovery on behalf of direct
purchasers is "automatic"--the state will recover if it proves that an overcharge occurred
and that direct purchasers were injured by it, irrespective of evidence that the direct pur-
chasers passed on all or part of the overcharges. Id.
77 15 U.S.C.A. § 15c(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977) expressly authorizes the "attorney general
of a State" to bring a parens patriae action "on behalf of natural persons residing in such
State." "State attorney general," within the meaning of the Act, refers to "the chief legal
officer of a State, or any other person authorized by State law to bring actions under
section 15c." Id. § 15g(1). Under § 4F(a) of the Act (id. § 15f(a)),
[w]henever the Attorney General of the United States has brought an action
under the antitrust laws, and he has reason to believe that any State attorney
general would be entitled to bring an action under [this Act] based substantially
on the same alleged violation . . . . he shall promptly give written notification
thereof to such State attorney general.
Furthermore, the United States Attorney General "shall, upon request by such State attor-
ney general, make available to him . . . any investigative files or other materials which are
or may be relevant." Id. § 15f(b).
78 Under the new legislation specifically authorizing state attorneys general to sue, a
state citizen could conceivably obtain a writ of mandamus compelling the attorney general
to bring a parens patriae action. Mandamus, however, generally lies only where the public
officer fails even to consider taking action. See, e.g., Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Ap-
peals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 144 P.2d 4 (1943); Rice v. Draper, 207 Mass. 577, 93 N.E. 821
(1911); State ex rel. Ramsey v. Industrial Comm'n, 140 Ohio St. 246, 42 N.E.2d 981 (1942).
In such a case, it forces the official to decide whether to take action, but does not affect the
decision itself; in other words, mandamus requires a decision, but not a particular out-
come. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal. 2d 303, 315, 144 P.2d 4, 11 (1943).
But see Goodell v. Woodbury, 71 N.H. 378, 52 A. 855 (1902) (chief of police compelled to
prosecute named violators of state liquor laws). Courts may, however, mandate specific
action if an agency's failure to act constitutes an abuse of discretion. See State ex rel. Cook
v. Richards, 61 S.D. 28, 245 N.W. 901 (1932) (state attorney compelled to take appeal from
decision of board of county commissioners). Nevertheless, because of the overwhelmingly
discretionary nature of parens patriae actions, mandamus will likely remain, in this context,
a seldom-used remedy of marginal value. See generally Nader v. Saxbe, 497 F.2d 676 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (United States Attorney General's decision not to prosecute violators of Federal
Corrupt Practices Act held immune from judicial review); Note, The Use of Mandamus to
Control Prosecutorial Discretion, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 563, 593-94 (1976).
79 The minority House Report accompanying the bill H.R. 8532, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) voiced concern that appointing state attorneys general to champion antitrust actions
would
provide a political incentive for antitrust enforcement in cases where even treble
damage awards provide no economic incentive.
We believe that politics and antitrust will not make a happy marriage. The
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direct compensation for purchasers actually injured reduces the
mechanism's attractiveness: to the extent that those injured are not
those who benefit from an increase in the state treasury, windfall
gains result, thus compromising the compensatory goal of the an-
titrust laws.
C. The Ownership-or-Control Exception
The Court in Illinois Brick implied that where a defendant-
supplier owns or controls the intermediary in a vertical chain of
distribution, an indirect purchaser may sue the supplier.80 If, for
example, a direct purchaser is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the
supplier, the exception would apply.81 This situation is clearcut.
But in cases involving only part-interests, courts will have to de-
termine what degree of ownership suffices to bring the exception
into play. 2 To the extent a supplier holds an equity interest in a
temptations for the politically ambitious to ride into the public eye as its champion
against "fat cat" antitrust violators by filing lawsuits to the sound of political trum-
pets may be too great. Since antitrust cases take years to complete, the politically
ambitious attorney general need not fear the embarrassment of a string of losses.
H.R. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2572, 2593. Other critics found the bill constitutionally defective under Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), on the ground that Congress cannot give state officials the power
to enforce the federal antitrust laws. Handler & Blechman, supra note 25, at 669-70.
80 See 97 S. Ct. at 2070 n.16.
81 By citing two decisions after articulating the ownership-or-control exception, the
Court hinted at two types of cases that probably satisfy the exception: (I) parent-subsidiary
relationships, in which a seller holds a majority of the direct purchaser's stock, and (2)
credit or other coercive relations, through which the seller has substantial influence over
the direct purchaser's actions. The Court first cited Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S.
642 (1969), a suit brought under § 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act (15 U.S.C. § 13(a)
(1970)). There, the defendant allegedly provided discriminatorily low gasoline prices to
competitors of the plaintiff. The price advantage passed through a wholesaler, who trans-
ferred the gasoline to its 60%-owned subsidiary, which resold the gasoline to its
55%-owned subsidiary, the direct competitor of the plaintiff. The Court held that the
plaintiff's right to recover the losses he suffered due to Standard Oil's wrongdoing was not
impeded "simply because the product in question passed through an additional formal
exchange before reaching the level of Perkins' actual competitor." 395 U.S. at 648.
The Court also cited In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974), in which the Ninth Circuit permitted the plaintiffs to show
that overcharges were passed on to them because, inter alia, "documents obtained . . .
during discovery tend to indicate that [the defendants] control a high percentage of their
direct customers of asphalt, either through acquisition of stock, or indirectly through vari-
ous financial arrangements, including credit." Id. at 195. The court did not define what
degree of control the "credit" or other "financial" arrangements must show; a simple alle-
gation of such arrangements convinced the court to deny the defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
82 Courts could insist on outright equity control-for example, 51% ownership of
stock-before raising the bar against suits by indirect purchasers. On the other hand, a
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direct purchaser who successfully sues for overcharges, the sup-
plier will recoup his own loss through the direct purchaser's gain.
Because this recoupment, regardless of its size, undercuts treble-
damage deterrence and punishment, courts should liberally apply
the ownership exception.
The "control" exception calls for a different analysis.8 3 A po-
tential antitrust defendant with control over the direct purchaser
can prevent the filing of a suit.84 Thus, courts should invoke the
exception only to ensure that sellers do not insulate themselves
from suit by creating clever distribution systems, or by strong-
minority interest might be sufficient to activate the exception. Most likely, application of
the exception will generally depend on the interplay between ownership and the "man-
agement" functions of the shareholder, i.e., the overlap of ownership and control. See
generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 188 (2d ed. 1970) ("In a
strict sense, management of a corporation is vested in its board of directors and sharehold-
ers have no functions of management as such. In the broader sense of participation in
control, shareholders have various management functions.").
s' The Court's use of the disjunctive "ownership or control" (97 S. Ct. at 2070 n.16
(emphasis added)) suggests that forms of nonfinancial dominance may activate the excep-
tion. In addition, courts should recognize that many cases will involve both ownership and
control. In these cases courts should be sensitive to concerns of both recoupment by the
violator and the unlikelihood of direct-purchaser actions.
84 The attributes of many franchising arrangements, for example, will place them
squarely within the ownership-or-control exception. Franchisors frequently maintain a
strong grip over their franchisees by dictating product lines, quality standards, and hours of
operation. In addition, they often make other policy decisions normally committed to in-
dependent management. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct.
2549 (1977) (franchisee controlled by restiictions on sales of Sylvania products from places
other than licensed location); Coe v. Easu, 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963) (franchisor oil com-
pany owned gas station licensed to franchisee, displayed its trademark on the premises,
and controlled maintenance standards and hours of operation). See generally Caves & Mur-
phy, Firms, Markets, and Intangible Assets, 42 So. EcoN. J. 572 (1976). In view of widespread
and far-reaching franchisor control, persons purchasing from franchisees should often be
able to recover damages resulting from franchisors' anticompetitive acts. Decisions deter-
mining whether franchise arrangements are "investment contracts" within the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970)) may shed light on the scope of the control ex-
ception since an "investment contract" exists only when expected profits are to be gener-
ated "solely from the efforts of others." SEC v. w.J. Hoywey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
Cf. United States v. Herr, 338 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1964) (franchise agreement under which
franchisor hired, trained, and managed sales force, held a security). However, most federal
courts have rejected attempts by franchisees to fit their franchise contracts into the defini-
tion of "investment contract," and have held that the franchisor's control over the fran-
chisee was insufficient to give rise to a security. See, e.g., Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak,
Inc., 460 F.2d 666 (10th Cir. 1972).
A plaintiff might assert one other form of nonfinancial dominance: conspiracy. By
alleging the existence of an agreement to conspire that "controlled" pricing decisions at
each level in the chain of distribution, ultimate buyers can illustrate thaf there are no
competitive markets separating them from the illegal actions of the manufacturer. Thus
they could avoid Illinois Brick's prohibition on indirect purchaser suits. See generally notes
94-98 and accompanying text infra.
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arming direct purchasers into choosing not to sue. 85 If the direct
purchaser has sued, this exception should not apply, regardless of
the original seller's degree of control.8 6
D. The Cost-Plus Contract Exception
The rule of Illinois Brick does not apply where an indirect
purchaser buys a predetermined quantity of price-fixed goods
under a cost-plus contract. Difficulties of proof disappear where
the direct purchaser in setting his price automatically adds a con-
tractually predetermined sum to the price he paid the initial seller;
accordingly, Illinois Brick permits the indirect purchaser to sue.87
This exception was devised in Hanover Shoe,88 but subsequent deci-
sions seldom mentioned it. Courts that noted the exception in per-
mitting indirect-purchaser suits never based their decisions solely
on the presence of a cost-plus contract. 89
85 If manufacturers attempt to insulate themselves from suit by establishing distribu-
tion systems that place all potential plaintiffs in the position of indirect consumers, the
"ownership or control" exception will present a significant roadblock. However, if the
lower courts actively use the "control" exception to scrutinize the formation of franchise
distributorships, the creation of distributorships will decline. This result conflicts to some
extent with the policy bases of the Court's holding in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977), which encourages formation of distributorships by
allowing manufacturers to regulate franchisees without interference from per se rules.
86 Courts should permit indirect purchasers to sue, however, if the direct-purchaser
plaintiff is not vigorously pursuing his cause of actiorl-a likely result where the wrongdoer
controls the direct-purchaser plaintiff.
87 "[T]he pre-existing cost-plus contract makes easy the normally complicated task of
demonstrating that the overcharge has not been absorbed by the direct purchaser." 97 S.
Ct. at 2068 n.12. See also id. at 2070. "[Tlhe purchaser is insulated from any decrease in its
sales as a result of attempting to pass on the overcharge, because its customer is committed
to buying a fixed quantity regardless of price." Id. at 2070. The direct purchaser may still
have a cause of action to the extent extra costs imposed by the restraint cause potential
customers to purchase elsewhere, and lost profits result.
88 392 U.S. at 494.
89 See, e.g., In re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973) (problems
of proof and multiple liability stressed), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974); Boshes v. General
Motors Corp., 59 F.R.D. 589, 597 (N.D. Il1. 1973) ("It can also be argued that facts such as
those presented here were contemplated to fall within the so-called 'cost-plus' exception,
although in that event the exception may be broader than the rule."); In re Master Key
Antitrust Litigation, [1973-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 74,680 (D. Conn. 1973) (issue of cost-
plus contract considered in conjunction with proof of damages and multiple recovery),
appeal dismissed, 528 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1975). Cf. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440
F.2d 1079, 1088 (2d Cir. 1971) (indirect purchasers allowed portion of settlement in part
because "arrangements under which the wholesalers and retailers resold these products
were, in virtually all cases, cost plus a set percentage markup."), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871
(1971). But see Obron v. Union Camp Corp., 477 F.2d 542 (6th Cir. 1973) (pass-on defense
permitted due to fixed-price contract where distributor billed his customers at the man-
ufacturer's list price and therefore suffered no damages).
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The majority in Illinois Brick specifically excluded "cost-based
rules of thumb" from the exception, a restriction that confines it to
a narrow set of facts. 90 Although cost-based rules of thumb may, at
times, operate smoothly and predictably, the chance of secret price
cuts and the sheer magnitude of the resulting accounting problems
militate strongly against a general exception founded on cost-based
rules of thumb.91 Thus, courts should normally resist invitations to
apply the cost-plus contract exception. On the other hand, the
cost-plus contract exception evinces the Court's willingness to allow
recovery absent difficulties of proof.92 Courts should therefore
permit suits brought by indirect purchasers capable of demonstrat-
ing the functional equivalent of a cost-plus contract. 93
90 97 S. Ct. at 2074. The Court rejected the assertion that offensive passing-on could
be used by the State of Illinois because the middleman-contractors charged the state a
fixed percentage above their costs. A pre-existing cost-plus contract, and not simply re-
liance on cost-based price setting, is necessary to activate the exception. The majority's
rejection of a cost-based pricing exception reflects its belief that in practice such formulas
would do little to reduce complexities of proof. For example, in those situations where a
buyer makes many purchases over an extended period of time, variations in mark-ups
would complicate tracing, thus undercutting the Court's concern for judicial economy. As
the Court noted,
[firms in many sectors of the economy rely to an extent on cost-based rules of
thumb in setting prices .... These rules are not adhered to rigidly, however; the
extent of the markup (or the allocation of costs) is varied to reflect demand condi-
tions.... The intricacies of tracing the effect of an overcharge on the purchaser's
prices, costs, sales, and profits thus are not spared the litigants.
Id.
91 Even in industries with "generally accepted" mark-ups, price-shaving from these
"cost-based rules of thumb" occurs in a fashion similar to secret price-cutting within a
cartel. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 10, at 158-64.
Two problems underlie the tendency for informal price-fixing and output-
restricting agreements to break down. First, the parties to the conspiracy may have
divergent ideas about appropriate price levels and market shares, making it dif-
ficult to reach an understanding which all will respect. Second, when the group
agrees to fix and abide by a price approaching monopoly levels, strong incentives
are created for individual members to cheat-that is, to increase their profits by
undercutting the fixed price slightly, gaining additional orders at a price which
still exceeds marginal cost.
Id. at 160. Another problem with utilizing "cost-based rules of thumb" is determining
"cost." Secret rebates, kickbacks, or other factors may cause the cost element to fluctuate,
and as a result, over- or under-compensate indirect purchasers relying on cost-based rules
of thumb as effective cost-plus contracts.
92 See note 87 supra.
93 For example, when a single indirect buyer sues for the overcharge on a single
purchase passed on by an intermediary using cost-based rules of thumb, variations in the
pricing formula would be irrelevant, and the method for determining the amount of the
overcharge passed-on would be substantially the same as that used in cases involving
purchases made pursuant to a pre-existing cost-plus contract. In both instances, costs could
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E. Vertical Restraints
The "indirect" purchaser alleging a vertical conspiracy 94 or
other vertical restraint95 should be able to remove himself from the
reach of Illinois Brick if he purchased directly from an intermediary
involved in the restraint. If, for example, a purchaser proves a
vertical conspiracy involving both manufacturers and middlemen,
he has effectively extracted himself from the indirect purchaser
classification.9 6 Because the liability of coconspirators is joint and
be determined by examining the middleman's purchasing records. The only difference
between the two situations is that under a pre-existing cost-plus contract, cost figures ap-
pear on the contract, while under cost-based pricing they appear in the middleman's pric-
ing records. Cf. [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 822, at B-6 (July 14,
1977) ("[T]he effect of the overcharge is determined in advance without regard to consid-
erations of supply and demand."). Although the Court intended the exception to have a
"narrow scope," any situation in which the overcharge is essentially determined in advance,
"without reference to the interaction of supply and demand" (97 S. Ct. at 2070) would
function in the same way.
94 A vertical conspiracy arises where buyers and sellers in the vertical chain of distribu-
tion conspire to achieve an anticompetitive end. See generally United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). It thus differs from a "horizontal" conspiracy, i.e., a
conspiracy between competitors on the same level of manufacturing or distribution.
" See generally L. SULLIVAN, siipra note 27, at 375-500. In addition to vertical con-
spiracies, commonly encountered vertical restraints include resale price maintenance
agreements, territorial or customer restrictions, and exclusive dealing requirements. Some
vertical restraints violate the antitrust laws only if they are unreasonable. See, e.g., Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977) (vertical location restriction
on retailers not per se violation). Others, however, are per se violations. See, e.g., Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (tying arrangement a per se
violation); United States v. Loew's Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (same); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (same); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)
(vertical resale price ceiling agreements per se violation). However, the legal standard ap-
plicable to a vertical restraint should not affect the validity, under Illinois Brick, of a com-
plaint alleging the restraint's existence.
96 By asserting that an agreement to conspire resulted in price-fixing at each level in
the chain of distribution, plaintiffs can offer to prove that there are no "competitive" mar-
kets separating them from the manufacturer; the manufacturer and the middleman are in
essence a single entity-the conspiracy-with which the plaintiff is in privity. At least one
court has alluded to this doctrine as a possible "exception" to the general rule barring offen-
sive passing-on. In Donson Stores, Inc. v. American Bakeries Co., 58 F.R.D. 481 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), a group of consumers filed a motion to intervene as plaintiffs on behalf of a class in
a suit brought by retail grocery stores against baking companies for alleged price-fixing.
The district court held that:
In the absence of an allegation that the alleged price fixing occurred at the point
of their purchase, i.e., that the manufacturers were guilty of unlawful vertical
price fixing at the retail level, the proposed intervenors have no legally cognizable
claim. The bare allegations in the proposed complaint that the retailers passed on
the overcharge to consumers do not state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Id. at 485.
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several, 97 problems of apportioning defendants' liability do not
occur.98 Similarly, other vertical restraints may directly injure a
plaintiff despite intervening vertical transactions. Thus, Illinois
Brick is inapposite where a plaintiff-purchaser sues a defendant-
manufacturer for damages inflicted by reason of vertical customer
restrictions agreed to by the manufacturer and the intervening
wholesaler.99 Courts should take care to distinguish indirect pur-
chasers from direct purchasers: a line of vertical transactions
separating the plaintiff from the defendant should not always trig-
ger an indirect purchaser analysis; an allegation of vertical restraint
should catalyze a more searching inquiry.
'7 See Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1903),
aff'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
That there was evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had been compelled to
pay an unreasonable price for the pipe which it bought during the continuance of
the unlawful combination complained of is not to be disputed. That its purchases
were made exclusively from the Anniston Pipe Company ... and that it is not
suing that corporation, is of no vital significance.
Id. at 25.
A number of courts have found that an antitrust plaintiff need not sue all possible
defendants but may choose to sue one particular conspirator. National Wrestling Alliance
v. Meyers, 325 F.2d 768, 775 (8th Cir. 1963) (dicta); Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager
Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co.,
280 F. Supp. 802, 804 (S.D. Cal. 1968).
98 If manufacturers and distributors or sellers are coconspirators in an antitrust viola-
tion, they are jointly and severally liable for the overcharge. The injured consumer can,
therefore, recover all his damages from any or all of the conspirators because all are impli-
cated in the conspiracy. See note 97 supra. Restoring the indirect purchaser to "privity" with
the violator eliminates the problem of tracing the overcharge through a number of market
levels.
The problem of apportioning damages among the defendants in an action for con-
tribution would pose few problems. Either damages could be split evenly, with each defen-
dant paying an equal share, or a tort theory might be applied whereby each coconspirator
would contribute in proportion to his wrongdoing. For a summary of the tort rule, see
Dawson v. Contractors Transp. Corp., 467 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Despite cases
rejecting contribution in the antitrust context (e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.,
[1977-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 61,533, at 72,110-11 (N.D. Cal. 1976)), one commentator
urges that, "as a matter of both law and sound antitrust policy, contribution among
coconspirators in treble damage actions should be allowed whether or not the cocon-
spirators are joined in the action." Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among
Coconspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REv. 111, 112 (1962). He
suggests that § 4 actions are in tort, whether under the Sherman Act or the Clayton Act.
Id. at 114.
"See Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 410 F. Supp. 536, 539 (D. Wyo. 1976)
(arrangement between manufacturer and wholesaler limiting customers actionable by re-
tailer, but held that enforcement of antitrust laws would conflict with state law enacted
pursuant to 21st Amendment); Call Carl, Inc. v. BP Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D.
Md. 1975) (plaintiff retailer failed to show existence of actionable vertical conspiracy be-
tween gasoline marketer and subsidiary to fix prices and refuse to deal).
ILLINOIS BRICK
IV
RESPONDING TO Illinois Brick
Illinois Brick enunciates a general rule barring suits by indirect
purchasers under section 4 of the Clayton Act. More fundamen-
tally, however, the decision attempts to reconcile the often compet-
ing policy interests associated with private enforcement of the an-
titrust laws in federal court. On some points, the Court in Illinois
Brick was correct: indirect purchasers who fall within the discern-
able exceptions to the decision's general rule are efficient and ef-
fective plaintiffs. In addition, the Court properly perceived that
overreliance on indirect-purchaser suits impairs the utility of the
private treble-damage action as an antitrust enforcement device.
The Court's error was in distilling an inflexible rule from
generalizations based on shifting policy considerations. The Court
correctly perceived the relevant variables: private enforcement, fair
compensation, effective deterrence, duplicative recoveries, and ju-
dicial economy.'00 It failed to appreciate, however, that a case-by-
case analysis would prove far more responsive to the Court's own
concerns by encouraging, rather than prohibiting, efficient in-
direct-purchaser suits. 1 1 For this reason, legislative modification of
the decision is desirable. The drafters of current proposed reme-
dial legislation, however, have failed to recognize the validity of the
policy goals identified in Illinois Brick. The proposed bills therefore
go too far in reversing the rule of Illinois Brick.
The Kennedy-Rodino proposal' 0 2 effectively nullifies the II-
100 Courts may in future cases find that Illinois Brick does not apply to a limited class of
indirect-purchaser suits despite the absence of any specific exception. In a case where
damages resulting from passing-on are readily provable, either because of the simple fac-
tual nature of the claim or the ingeniousness of the plaintiff, the suit should proceed so
long as there is no danger of multiple liability. For example, where an indirect purchaser
sues a small number of sellers, whose residence in the same state facilitates joinder, the
court should not dismiss the suit ab initio. If the suit presents no possibility of duplicative
damages and raises no problems of apportionment, the policy bases underlying Illinois
Brick suggest that the court should permit, not bar, the action. This exception, like the
cost-plus contract exception, should be narrowly drawn. However, recognition of an ab-
sent-policy-bases "exception" will insure that those few indirect purchasers whose suits im-
pose no super-normal costs on the judicial system will proceed. Antitrust enforcement will
thus increase, without resulting in inordinate judicial costs or unfairness to litigants.
101 Courts make similar value judgments when considering the manageability of class
actions under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Under Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.s. 156
(1974), the manageability of a class suit hinges on constitutional issues, such as individual
notice to each affected class member and due process of law.
102 S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (A Bill to Restore Effective Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws); H.R. 8359, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (identical House bill).
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linois Brick decision by amending section 4 to read, in part, "[t]hat
any person who shall be injured in fact, directly or indirectly...
may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained."'10 3 This version restores the substantive rights
of indirect purchasers under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
10 4
By requiring a direct purchaser to prove injury-in-fact, the amend-
ment also resurrects the passing-on defense where a direct-pur-
chaser plaintiff has mitigated damages by passing on illegal over-
charges. 0 5
A later version of the Senate proposal, the Consumer Antitrust
Act of 1977, remains in committee.'0 6 This bill specifically sets
forth congressional findings and purposes, and details congres-
sional intentions in amending section 4.107 In addition to overrul-
103 Id. The bills would add the "in fact, directly or indirectly" language to § 4 and § 4A
of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 15 & 15a (1970)). Fearful that Illinois Brick might also
nullify the new parens patriae legislation (see notes 68-79 and accompanying text supra), the
bill's drafters added the same language to § 4C(a)(1) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.A
§ 15c(a)(1) (West Supp. 1977)).
104 The crucial words in the Kennedy-Rodino proposal are "directly or indirectly," a
phrase that repudiates the restrictions Illinois Brick places on indirect-purchaser suits. In
the words of Congressman Rodino, the Court's decision "flouts the intent of Congress [as
exemplified in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act] and it must be
changed." [1977] ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 823, at A-4 (July 21, 1977).
10' See generally id. at A-11 (statement of John H. Shenefield, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee). Shenefield's testimony indicates that
the Kennedy-Rodino bill will nullify the restrictions Hanover Shoe placed on defensive pass-
ing-on. In his view, the Kennedy-Rodino bill
[a]ddresses the Court's fear of multiple liability by permitting any plaintiff to re-
cover who can prove injury in fact. A defendant would not be faced with the
prospect of being denied the right to use passing-on defensively in a suit by direct
purchasers, while nevertheless being subject to an award of damages in a suit by
purchasers further down the distribution chain based on an allegation that the
illegal overcharge was passed to them.
Id. at A-11.
When introducing the bill on the floor of the Senate, Senator Kennedy said that the
new legislation would improve the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement in two ways:
[F]irst. ... many persons who ... are denied recovery under Illinois Brick, because
they are "indirect" parties, will have their remedy restored, and second .... the
windfall recovery now received by direct parties who recover the full amount of
the overcharge, even though they have passed on most or all of the overcharge,
will be eliminated.
123 CONG. REc. S12,040 (daily ed. July 15, 1977). At this writing, both the Senate and
House bills are still in committee.
106 Telephone interview with Terry Lytle, counsel to Senate Antitrust Subcommittee,
Nov. 8, 1977. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1977, at A-30, col. 1.
107 The bill finds that Illinois Brick "frustrates effective antitrust enforcement and de-
prives many consumers of a just remedy for their injury." S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 2(a)(3) (1977) (revised version). The purposes of the bill include the restoration of a
cause of action to indirect purchasers (§ 2(b)(1)), the prevention of windfall recoveries
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ing Illinois Brick, the new version overrules Hanover Shoe: the de-
fendant is entitled to prove as a partial or complete defense to a
treble-damage claim that the plaintiff has passed-on the overcharge
to others.' 08 Apparently in an attempt to minimize strike suits, the
revised bill prohibits indirect purchasers from asserting their
claims in class actions.' 0 9
Such radical surgery is inappropriate. Returning the law to its
pre-Hanover Shoe state will reduce the threat of private suits by
removing the direct purchaser's full overcharge recovery. Court-
room proceedings, however, even absent consumer class actions,
will be considerably complicated; this will impose potentially pro-
hibitive costs on plaintiffs and the judicial system. Furthermore,
symmetrical use of pass-on theories may often result in the defen-
dant either escaping liability completely or facing a multitude of
inconsistent judgments resulting in duplicative damage awards. Fi-
nally, it is unclear what effect removing direct purchasers' "au-
tomatic" recoveries would have on their incentive to sue, and
whether indirect-purchaser actions would take up the slack.
Apportioning damages and employing procedural devices to
bring interested parties together can avoid many of the problems
inherent in recognizing an offensive pass-on theory. 1 0 A better
legislative response, however, would (1) retain to some extent the
Hanover Shoe bar to defensive passing-on; (2) acknowledge the va-
lidity of the policy bases of Illinois Brick, perhaps even to the extent
of condoning the decision on its facts, while eschewing any notion
of excluding most indirect purchasers from the courtroom; (3)
formulate guidelines founded on these policies to be applied on a
case-by-case basis; and (4) promulgate special procedures to help
meet the goals underlying Illinois Brick. 11
(§ 2(b)(2)), and the preservation of the right of state attorneys general to sue on behalf of
resident consumers (§ 2(b)(3)).
10s S. 1874, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(b) (1977) (revised version). Section 2(b)(6) of the
Kennedy bill reserves to the courts the "applications and revision of existing principles of
remoteness, target area and proximate cause which have been applied to limit the persons
who can recover for antitrust violations." The Illinois Brick majority distinguished the prob-
lem of standing from the problem of injury, which it termed "analytically distinct." 97 S.
Ct. at 2066 n.7.
109 N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1977, at A-30, col. 1.
110 See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
'" A convenient starting point for legislative analysis based on these factors is pro-
vided in the following proposed statute:
Sec. l(a). In any private or class action brought pursuant to sections 4, 4A, or
4C of the Clayton Act, plaintiffs shall be limited in their recovery to three times
any actual damages sustained, directly or indirectly. Proof of indirect injury by
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Whether couched in terms of expanding the Hanover Shoe-
Illinois Brick exceptions or in terms of forging a substitute general
rule, legislative guidelines would provide an appropriate reference
point from which courts could evaluate indirect-purchaser suits.
This approach would facilitate a flexible application of the Hanover
Shoe rule, and simultaneously permit reconciliation and preserva-
tion of the policy bases underlying Illinois Brick.
Emanations from the Court itself tend to support a case-by-
case approach. The Court's disinclination to fashion per se rules in
the substantive areas of antitrust law casts doubt on the validity
and consistency of the rule articulated in Illinois Brick." 2 A per se
plaintiffs shall be contingent on demonstrating that the action is manageable and
presents neither substantial problems of proof nor substantial risk of unfairness to
defendants or other litigants.
Sec. l(b). Where suits by indirect purchasers or sellers have been dismissed
for reasons of unmanageability, unfairness, or difficulty of proof, the court may,
in a subsequent action brought by a direct purchaser or seller, preclude proof that
the plaintiffs passed on the defendant's overcharges.
Sec. 1(c). Where a defendant, pursuant to section l(a) of this Act, attempts to
show that one or more plaintiffs passed on all or part of an overcharge resulting
from illegal activity, the court may condition the use of this defense on joinder of
any or all indirect purchasers or sellers alleged to have sustained all or part of the
damages.
Sec. 1(d). In fashioning orders and relief under the authority of this Act,
courts shall take into consideration the following factors:
(1) the need to protect litigants from duplicative liability;
(2) the need for effective enforcement of the antitrust laws; and
(3) the need to avoid unjust enrichment accruing to plaintiffs and defendants.
Sec. 1(e). In every action brought pursuant to this Act, parties may be freely
joined, subject only to the limits imposed by the due process clause of the United
States Constitution. A court may order such joinder on its own motion.
112 During the same month that Illinois Brick was decided, the Court refused to apply a
per se rule to vertical territorial restraints. In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania
Inc., 97 S. Ct. 2549 (1977), the Court held that the location restrictions which Sylvania
imposed upon its retailers should be judged under the "rule of reason" and that "depar-
ture from the rule of reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect
rather than . . . upon a formalistic line drawing." Id. at 2562. The Court's decision was a
refusal to find a broad area of commercial practice illegal "without elaborate inquiry as to
the precise harm [the vertical restraints] have caused or the business excuse for their use."
Id. at 2558.
Although Illinois Brick does not use per se rule language, the decision has the same
sweeping effect. In this sense, the Court's rationale in Continental T.V. conflicts with its
decision in Illinois Brick. In fact, the Court in Continental T.V. cautioned against per se rules
because
[o]nce established, per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community
and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system of the more
complex rule of reason trials ... but those advantages are not sufficient in them-
selves to justify the creation of per se rules. If it were otherwise, all of antitrust law
would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing an unintended and undesirable
rigidity in the law.
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rule should obtain, if at all, only after lower courts have had exten-
sive dealings with indirect purchasers.113 In addition, recognition
of the cost-plus exception evinces even the Court's willingness to
hear suits brought by indirect purchasers where the policy bases
underlying the decision are absent.114 Applying this case-by-case
analysis to the many antitrust fact patterns will require sophisti-
cated analysis. But with continued Supreme Court guidance, low-
er courts could permit suits by indirect purchasers where actions by
direct purchasers do not appear likely and where the costs of such
enforcement are not prohibitive to either courts or litigants. Only
by distinguishing between efficient and inefficient plaintiffs can
courts properly address concerns of enforcement and fair compen-
sation. A case-by-case approach would also allow courts to fashion
creative responses to problems of apportionment and multiple lia-
bility. Legislation requiring a balancing approach thus would con-
form to, rather than contravene, the policies underlying Illinois
Brick.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Brick decision eliminates the availability of the
treble-damage remedy for most indirect purchasers damaged by
passed-on overcharges. Although the policies underlying this re-
sult are unquestionably valid, Illinois Brick does not provide the
optimal rule for finding effective and efficient antitrust plaintiffs.
This failure necessitates legislative action. Bills introduced in the
Id. at 2558 n.16. Likewise, a rule that bars all indirect buyers from suing regardless of the
complexities of their claims, results in "undesirable rigidity in the law." Id. See also In re
Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 919
(1974), where the Ninth Circuit stated that:
We do not believe that the Supreme Court [in Hanover Shoe] intended a per se
rule with respect to passing on .... The Court was applying policy to a specific
case. We do not think we should sacrifice enforcement of the antitrust laws in this
case in favor of considerations of judicial economy when, we must assume, proof
of passing on is at hand, and in triable form.
Id. at 199. Courts sympathetic to plaintiffs' claims may likewise attempt to distinguish the
cases before them by contending that the facts of a particular case do not present insuper-
able tracing or multiple-liability problems, therefore making the logic of Illinois Brick inap-
plicable. See note 100 supra.
": In White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), the Court emphasized its
reluctance to fashion per se rules affecting vertical territorial restraints, stating that "[w]e
need to know more than we do about the actual impact of these arrangements on competi-
tion to decide whether they have such a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack ... any
redeeming virtue' and therefore should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman
Act." Id. at 263 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
114 See notes 87-93, 100, and accompanying text supra.
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wake of the decision, however, ignore problems generated by sim-
ply resurrecting offensive and defensive passing-on. Congress
should carefully reread Illinois Brick, pay close attention to the
policies it seeks to uphold, and pass legislation requiring courts to
evaluate and balance those policies on a case-by-case basis.
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